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COMPETITION AND THE ROLE OF ANTITRUST

LAW
In the model of perfect competition, the market is so populated by
sellers and buyers that no one individual can influence the market price
through' the manipulation of input or output. "All relevant prices are
known to each producer, who also knows of all input combinations
technically capable of producing any specific combination of outputs and
who makes input-output decisions solely to maximize profits."' All
individuals are price takers. Producers maximize their profits by
producing at a level where their marginal cost equals their average market
cost.
However, markets fail. Markets have imperfections. Individuals
do not always know whether the price of an item at the store on the corner
is the same as the one next door. In fact, the price of an item is usually
lower at a megastore due to economies of scale. There are also social
costs for certain activities and different government tax rates. Products are
not really homogenous, and advertisements make a difference.
Government protectionism and artificial barriers exist.
Firms accumulate market power because "[m]arket forces are [not]
sufficiently strong, self correcting and well directed to guarantee the
results that perfect competition would bring." 2 This type of market failure
is due to a monopoly or to an oligopoly. A monopoly or oligopoly exists
when a single firm or just a few firms produce a product with no close
substitutes. These firms are no longer price takers. Rather, they
maximize their profits by looking for the most convenient price. Firms
which produce at a level where marginal revenue and marginal cost equal
average cost are able to sell their products at a higher price than where the
market offer intersects the demand curve.
Correspondingly, governments intervene in the market using
antitrust laws and agencies to correct the above mentioned market failures.
These competition laws address two problems arising from too much
market power, "the inefficient allocation of resources and the unfair
distribution of the gains from exchange."1

1. PHILIP AREEDA & LOUiS KAPLOW, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS, PROBLEMS, TEXTS, CASES
8 (4 ' ed. 1981).

2. Id.at 13.
3. Louis De Alesi, The Public-Choice Model of Antitrust Enforcement, in THE CAUSES
AND CONSEQUENCES OF ANTITRUST:

McChesney et al. eds., 1995).

THE PUBLIC CHOICE PERSPECTIVE

192 (Fred S.,
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Countries like Costa Rica have just enacted competition laws'.
Based on the experience of the United States, this article tries to explain
how certain parts of Costa Rican competition law should be interpreted and
provide reasons for the suggested interpretation.
This article follows the path of the United States Sherman and
Clayton Antitrust Acts and the ensuing case law. The judicial decisions
which will be cited correspond to those studied in the 1995-1996 fall
Antitrust Law course taught at Harvard Law School by Professor Louis
Kaplow. Currently, only two cases have been filed with the Costa Rican
Commission. They have not yet been decided, and the Commission has not
initiated any investigations ex-officio. Thus, no Costa Rican judicial or
administrative decision has been produced.
II. ARTICLE 11: ABSOLUTE MONOPOLISTIC PRACTICES
Absolute monopolistic practices consist of those actions, contracts,
agreements, arrangements, or combinations among economic competitors
whose purposes are the following:
a) fixing, raising, and manipulating the selling or purchasing price of
goods or services in the market, or exchanging information with the
same purpose or consequence [hereinafter referred to as the price
provision].
b) establishing the obligation to produce, process, distribute, or
commercialize only a restricted or limited quantity of goods or
rendering a number, volume, or a restricted or limited frequency of
services [hereinafter referred to as the quota provision].
c) dividing, distributing, allocating, or imposing parts of present or future
markets of goods and services through customers, suppliers, space, or
time [hereinafter referred to as the allocation of markets provision].
d) establishing, or coordinating the participation in bids, auction sales, or
the abstention thereof. In the application of this provision, the
Commission shall control ex-officio or per request those markets with
few suppliers. The practices referred to in this provision shall be null
and void and the economic agents participating in those practices shall
be sanctioned in conformity with this law [hereinafter referred to as
the cooperation of bids provision].'

4. Ley de Promoci6n de la Competencia y Defensa Efectiva del Consumidor [P.C.D.E.C.],
no. 7472, 19 Dec. 1994, art. 10 (Costa Rica) ( translation to English by the writer).
5. P.C.D.E.C. art. 11 (Costa Rico).
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A. The Scope of Monopolistic Practices
Although article 11 of the P.C.D.E.C. refers to monopolistic
practices, it does not regulate monopolies or the acts of monopolies., It
does not regulate individual conduct, regardless of whether it causes an
All the activities described in
undue restraint on competition.
subparagraphs (a) through (d) of article 11 require the cooperation of a
minimum of two parties. The party's actions should be the product of
"actions, contracts, agreements, arrangements or combinations among
economic competitors.", (emphasis added).
Article 11 regulates oligopolies which cause an undue restraint on
competition, as does section 1 of the United States Sherman Antitrust Act.
The Sherman Antitrust Act provides that "[elvery contract, combination..
or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal

...

.

Neither article 11 nor section 1 expressly refer to oligopolies.
However, in order to cause an undue restraint of competition, the activities
must be taken by oligopolies under both provisions.10
An oligopoly is simply defined as a monopoly shared by relatively
few firms which recognize their interdependence and act in accordance
Areeda and Kaplow mention four key
with such interdependence."
elements for an oligopoly to be successful., For the purposes of this
paper, these elements will be deemed to be the core of acting in
accordance with such interdependence. The four elements are as follows:
1) A consensus on price needs to be reached. Differences in costs have
to be disregarded. A floor price will be set by the least efficient firm.
In any case, since the level of production will be set at the point
where marginal revenue and marginal cost equal average cost, firms
will be able to sell at a price higher than where the market offer and
demand curves intersect each other. In order for a consensus on
6. P.C.D.E.C. art. 11
7. P.C.D.E.C. art. 11
8. P.C.D.E.C. art. 11
9. P.C.D.E.C. art. 11
10.

(Costa Rica).
(Costa Rica).
(Costa Rica).
(Costa Rica).

P.C.D.E.C. art. 11 (Costa Rica); Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, 15 U.S.C. § 1

(1980).
11.

See generally 6 PHILIP AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST

PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION (1985); Donald Turner, The Definition of Agreement
Under the Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelism and Refisals to Deal, 75 HARV. L. REV. 655
(1962); Richard Posner, Oligopoly and the Antitrust Laws: A Suggested Approach, 21 STAN. L.
REV. 1562 (1969).
12. AREEDA & KAPLOW, supra note 1, at 278.
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prices to be reached, channels of communications must be available
and used. Communication may be formal or informal.
2) Firms must be able to compare their own prices vis-a-vis other firms
prices, quality, and promotions.
3) Cheating must be detectable and punishable.
4) Lastly, but of great importance, producers must collectively enjoy
market power.
Correspondingly, article 11 is only applicable to oligopolies which
enter into contracts which unduly restrict competition. Under Costa Rican
law, if an action is brought against a party which is not an oligopoly, or
against an oligopoly which is not cooperating with another oligopoly to
restrict competition, then the action should be dismissed. In order to
determine whether a firm is a part of an oligopoly, the above elements
need to be jointly taken into account."
B. Meaning of Agreement
Article 11 deals with actions, contracts, agreements, arrangements,
or combinations among economic competitors." Its wording is similar to
that of section 1.15 A written agreement among competitors to unduly
restrain competition for their own benefit is clearly illegal under United
States and Costa Rican law."
However, problems do arise when
establishing the existence of a tacit or inferred agreement.
United States case law has concluded that mere parallelism in
competitive behavior is not an antitrust violation. In Theater Enterprises
v. Paramount Film Distributing Corp., common conduct among the
respondents was found to exist. They uniformly rebuffed Petitioner's
request to obtain first-run features for its theater." Did Respondent's
refusals to Petitioner's request stem from independent decision or from a
tacit agreement? The court answered that:
[B]usiness behavior is admissible circumstantial evidence
from which the fact finder may infer agreement. .

.

. But

this Court has never held that a proof of parallel business
behavior establishes agreement or, phrased differently, that
such behavior itself constitutes a Sherman Act offense.
Circumstantial evidence of consciously parallel behavior
13. P.C.D.E.C. art. 11 (Costa Rica).
14.
15.
16.
17.

P.C.D.E.C. art. 11 (Costa Rica).
P.C.D.E.C. art. 11 (Costa Rica).
P.C.D.E.C. art. 11 (Costa Rica); Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1890).
Theater Enter. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537 (1954).
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may have made heavy inroads into the traditional judicial
attitude toward conspiracy, but 'conscious parallelism' has
not yet read conspiracy out of the Sherman Act entirely. 8
In Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., the
plaintiffs alleged that the defendants conspired to charge unduly low
prices. Even in the presence of a reason to conspire, the Court could not
establish the existence of an agreement without an inference of actual
conspiracy." Thus, parallel conduct and some other factors would be
required in the United States to determine whether a tacit or inferred
agreement exists."°

For instance, in American Tobacco Co. v. United States the
parallel behavior was accompanied by evidence that the related price
increase occurred in spite of decreasing input prices. Additionally,
Respondents could not offer any explanation as to why prices across the
industry increased while costs decreased. 2'
In Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers' Association v. United
States, the Court held that:
[C]onspiracies are seldom capable of proof by direct
testimony and may be inferred from the things actually
done, and when in this case by concerted action the names
of wholesalers who were reported as having made sales to
consumers were periodically reported to the other
members of the association, the conspiracy to accomplish
that which was the natural consequence of such action may
be readily inferred.Y
Thus, the retailer's decision not to purchase was not independent; it was
the product of agreement materialized in the circulated list of offenders.
The factors required in order to determine whether an agreement
exists have not been clearly defined by United States courts. However, the
decisions cited above provide some guidance. Some considerations that
may be taken into account are as follows:
a. Sudden across-the-industry unexpected change of behavior.
b. "a" is not reasonably explained by other factors.

18. Id.at 541.
19. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1946).
20 "The other facts that serve to transform parallelism into conspiracy . . . are often
characterized as 'plus factors.'" AREEDA & KAPLOW, supra note 1, at 308.
21. American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946).
22. Eastern States Retail Lumber Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600, 609, 612 (1914).
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c. "a" involves risk.

d. A benefit (and hence a motive) would be derived from "a." (as long as
it is across-the industry).
e. All the four elements required for the existence of an oligopoly detailed
under "1." above are present.
Hence, under United States law, given the above circumstances in
a degree which may allow a reasonable inference, it is possible for a fact
finder to determine that an agreement exists even though there is no
written agreement, proof of conversations, or exchange of documents.
Nevertheless, for such a determination to be made certain
economic conditions of the relevant market should exist. Since the
potential gains from collusion are determined by the elasticity of demand,"3
[in] cases of alleged or suspected [tacit] collusion, it will
be possible to make a threshold judgment as to whether the
conditions in the market indicate that the elasticity of
demand at the competitive price is probably so high that
collusive pricing would be an unprofitable strategy to
follow even if it were costless to collude. Such a judgment
will help the enforcement agencies to allocate their
resources intelligently and avoid the pursuit of shadows
and chimeras, which unfortunately is a very large part of
the antitrust enforcement today.,
Posner lists the economic conditions favorable to monopolistic collusion: a
market concentrated with few sellers; there are no sellers on the fringe of
the market; inelastic demand at a competitive price; entry into the market
is very difficult; product standardization; the principal firms sell at the
same level in the chain of distribution; price is more important than other
forms of competition; a high ratio of fixed to variable costs; and whether
demand is static or declining over time. "5
The burden of proof, of course, lies with the plaintiff.
Additionally, in accordance with Matsushita Electronic Indus. Co., the
plaintiff must present evidence "that tends to exclude the possibility that
the alleged conspirators acted independently. "26 Therefore, the plaintiff
23. The elasticity of demand may be defined as the percentage change in quantity demanded
as a result of a one percent change in price.
24. RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 50 (1976).

25. Id. at 55. The less standardized a product is, the more difficult it will be for the sellers
of the product to collude effectively.
26.

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588 (1946) (citing

Monsanto Co. v. Spry-Rite Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984)).
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must first submit evidence on the existence of an inferred agreement
relying on the factors above, and then exclude the possibility of non-.
conspiratorial action.
Under Costa Rican law, the threshold would be stricter. Article
11 encompasses express and tacit agreements, although it does not
encompass inferred agreements."1 Agreements do not need to be written
down in order to meet the threshold.2 However, sufficient proof as to the
actual existence of the agreement would be required, such as minutes of
meetings, telephone conversations, exchange of documents to the effect,
etc.
Additionally, economic conditions favorable for the existence of
such agreement should exist because in their absence the existence of an
agreement to collude is very unlikely. It would just not be profitable.
Finally, as in the United States, the burden of proof would lie with the
plaintiff."
C. The price provision of article 11
The price provision of article 11 of the Costa Rican competition
law prohibits the following two practices:"
1) fixing, raising,
manipulating the selling or purchasing price of goods or services in the
market [hereinafter generally referred to as price fixing]," and 2)
exchanging information with the same purpose or consequence."
Each prohibition deserves a separate and independent analysis
which follows.
1. Price fixing
Price fixing may be beneficial not only for the parties engaging in
it, but also for other groups, society and the free market. An ensuing
conclusion from the above statement is that price fixing is not always
detrimental and should not always be illegal.
Legal and notary fees in Costa Rica are set by a statute.1 A top of
the line attorney should charge the same for a two million colones law suit

27. P.C.D.E.C. art. 11 (Costa Rica).
28. P.C.D.E.C. art. 11 (Costa Rica).
29. P.C.D.E.C. art. 11 (Costa Rica).
30.
31.
32.
33.

P.C.D.E.C.
P.C.D.E.C.
P.C.D.E.C.
P.C.D.E.C.

art.
art.
art.
art.

II(Costa
II(Costa
II(Costa
II(Costa

Rica).
Rica).
Rica).
Rica).

34. P.C.D.E.C. art. II(Costa Rica).
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as a freshman attorney who has just graduated from law school. Would
such a statute be illegal?
In Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, the United States Supreme
Court found a county bar association's legal services scheduling of
minimum fees to be illegal." Although, it did so only because the state
court had not specifically required it." Had the schedule been required by
the state, it would have likely been found to be legal. However, the Court
did hold although a bar association's rule prescribing minimum fees for
legal services violated section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, certain
practices by members of a learned profession might survive scrutiny under
the rule of reason even though those practices would be viewed as a
violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act in another context.
Correspondingly, in general, safety or ethical standards may
provide an acceptable justification for fixing prices." A code of ethics of a
learned profession may impose reasonable standards.19 In certain cases,
blunt competition among professionals (engineers, doctors, etc.) may be
contrary to the public interest.'4 Without such standards, professionals
may opt for cheaper and inefficient instruments or methods of operating.
These competitive pressures to offer services at the lowest price would
adversely affect quality.
Awarding contracts to the lowest bidder,
regardless of quality, could be dangerous to public health, safety, and
welfare.4" In National Society of ProfessionalEngineers v. United States,
the Court held that:
[w]e adhere to the view expressed in Goldfarb that, by
their nature, professional services may differ significantly
from other business services, and, accordingly, the nature
of the competition in such services may vary. Ethical
norms may serve to regulate and promote this competition,
and thus fall within the Rule of Reason., 2
The Court further acknowledged in footnote twenty-two that:

35. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 790 (1975).
36. Id.at 790.
37. Id. at 792.

38. National Soc'y of Prof'l Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978) (extracted from
arguments unsuccessfully put forth by petitioners).
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.at 696.
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Courts have, for instance, upheld marketing restraints
related to the safety of a product, provided that they have
no anticompetitive effect and that they are reasonably
ancillary to the seller's main purpose of protecting the
public from harm or itself from product liability. (See,
e.g. Tripoli Co. v. Wella Corp., 425 F. 2d. 932 (3d Cir.
1970) (en banc).41
Likewise, joint ventures and strategic alliances entered into by
competitors are not necessarily illegal. In United States v. Joint Traffic
Assn., the Court decided that the formation of corporations and
partnerships and appointments of joint sales agents and leases have never
been understood to be a restraint of trade as that term is legally defined."
In Broadcast Music v. Columbia Broadcasting System, the Court stated
that joint ventures and other cooperative arrangements are also not usually
unlawful, at least not as price fixing schemes where the agreement on price
is necessary to market the product at all.' Other possible, reasonable, and
judicially accepted justifications for agreements fixing prices are "the
integration of sales, monitoring and enforcement against unauthorized
copyright use," the improvement of efficiency, the reduction of costs, and
the consequential creation of a new product or of a new market."
In Broadcast Music, the question was whether the issuance of
blanket licenses to copyright musical compositions at fees negotiated by
them was per se illegal under the antitrust laws.,, The Court found that the
alleged practices were reasonable and that a careful analysis of the facts
was appropriate in order to determine their legality (or their lack thereof)."
It is interesting to note that the District Court, though denying
summary judgment to certain defendants, had ruled that the practices did
not fall under the per se rule, and second, after an eight-week trial the
Music
dismissal of the complaint inasmuch as negotiation of Broadcast
9
with individual copy right owners was available and feasible.

43. Id. at 696 n.22.
44. United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505 (1898).
'4" Broadcast Music v. Columbia Broadcast Sys., 441 U.S. 1 (1979). See generally United
States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158, 179 (1964); United States v. E.I. du Pont de
Nemours, 353 U.S. 586, 607 (1957).
46. BroadcastMusic, 441 U.S. at 20.
47. Id.at 4.
48. Id.at 2.
49. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. American Soc'y of Composers, 400 F. Supp. 737
(1975).
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The Supreme Court itself justified price fixing by accepting an
efficiencies argument,
But even for television network licenses, . . . [ASCAP]

reduces costs absolutely by creating a blanket license that
is sold only a few, instead of thousands, of times, and that
obviates the need for closely monitoring the networks to
see that they do not use more than they paid for.
[ASCAP] . . . also provides the necessary resources for

blanket sales and enforcement, resources unavailable to the
vast majority of composers and publishing houses..
Moreover, a bulk license of some type is a necessary
consequence of the integration necessary to achieve these
efficiencies, and a necessary consequence of an aggregate
license is that its price must be established. .

.

. This

substantial lowering of costs, which is of course potentially
beneficial to both sellers and buyers, differentiates the
blanket license from individual use licenses. The blanket
license is composed of the individual compositions plus the
aggregating service. Here the whole is truly greater than
the sum of its parts; it is, to some extent, a different
product.

.

.[BroadcastMusic], in short, made a market in

which individual composers are inherently unable to
compete fully effectively.Furthermore, the Court in note forty of its opinion stated that, "because of
the nature of the product . . . a composition can be simultaneously,
consumed, by many users . . . composers have numerous incentives to

produce, so the blanket license is unlikely to cause decreased output, one
of the normal undesirable effects of a cartel.",
Correspondingly, the Supreme Court remanded the case for
further proceedings to consider any unresolved issues that CBS may have
properly brought to the Court of Appeals. 2 More important, however, is
the fact that on remand the original district court decision was affirmed,
thereby concluding that the analyzed price fixing was justified, and,
therefore, legal."

50. Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 21.
51. Id. at 22 n.40.
52. Id. at 25.
53. CBS v. American Soc'y of Composers, 620 F.2d 930 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450
U.S. 970 (1981).
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After the Broadcast Music decision, the Supreme Court confirmed
that not every price fixing agreement is necessarily illegal.-" In National
Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) v. Board of Regents of the
University of Oklahoma, the Court reviewed a plan adopted in 1981 for the
1982-1985 seasons intended to reduce the adverse effects of live television
upon football game attendance. ss Also in 1981, the College Football
Association (CFA) obtained an alternate plan from National Broadcasting
Co. (NBC), "which would have allowed more liberal number of
appearances for each college [part of the CFA], and would have increased
the overall revenues realized by CFA members. In response the NCAA
publicly announced that it would take disciplinary action against any CFA
member that complied with CFA-NBC contract. "-1
In fact, the NCAA created a, horizontal restraint an agreement among competitors on the way in which they
will compete with one another. A restraint of this type has
often been held to be unreasonable as a matter of law.
Because it places a ceiling on the number of games
member institutions may televise, the horizontal agreement
places an artificial limit on the quantity of televised
football games that is available to broadcasters and
consumers. By restraining the quantity of televisi6n rights
available for sale, the challenged practices create a
limitation on output .... 1
Nevertheless, the NCAA put forth a series of explanations to its
plan. After a careful analysis of all of them, the Court verified that
justifications may be invoked and, if applicable, in due course accepted:
"[Broadcast Music] squarely holds that a joint selling arrangement may be
so efficient that it will increase sellers' aggregate output and thus be
procompetitive. Similarly, as we indicated in Sylvania, a restraint in a
limited aspect of a market may actually enhance marketwide
competition. "I
Finally, the Court concluded that

54. Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 24.

55. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Oklahoma, 468
U.S. 85 (1984).
56. Id. at 95.
57. Id. at 99.
58. Id. at 103.
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[t]he NCAA plays a critical role in the maintenance of a
revered tradition of amateurism in college sports. There
can be no question but that it needs ample latitude to play
that role, or that the preservation of the student-athlete in
higher education adds richness and diversity to
intercollegiate athletics and is entirely consistent with the
goals of the Sherman Act.59

Most recently a price fixing agreement among Ivy League
Universities was held to be legal. In United States v. Brown, the Court
applying a rule of reason analysis, and for social welfare reasons, found an
agreement among the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and eight
other Ivy League schools to be legal.6°
.In short, price fixing arrangements may be legal. Under United
States law, justifications put forth by defendants should be heard and
carefully analyzed by the competent administrative agencies and courts.
So should they be under Costa Rican competition law. The price provision
of article 11 is not a blunt statement which accepts no tests.6 In general
terms, the dicta in the landmark case of Chicago Board of Trade v. United
States"z ought to be followed: "The true test of legality is whether the
restraint imposed merely regulates and perhaps promotes competition or
whether it may suppress or even destroy competition. '"
2. The Exchange of Information Provision:
Under Costa Rican competition law, in order for an exchange of
information among competitors to be illegal, it must have the purpose or
consequence of fixing prices."
In other words, the exchange of

59. Id. at 120.
60. United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658 (1993).

The eight Ivy League schools

include Brown University, Columbia University, Cornell University, Dartmouth College,
Harvard University, Princeton University, the University of Pennsylvania, and Yale University.
61. P.C.D.E.C. art. 11 (Costa Rica).
62. Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
63. Id. at 238. The case also provides guidance in' specific terms:
To determine that question the court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the
business to which the restraint is applied; its condition before and after the restraint
was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The history

of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular
remedy, and the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant factors.
d.
64. P.C.D.E.C. art. 11 (Costa Rica).
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information would be the instrument materializing or facilitating an
agreement to fix prices or intending to do so.
United States treatment of this issue coincides with the Costa Rican
approach, that is, exchanges of information which materialize or facilitate
an agreement are illegal.63 However, an important caveat is required here:
United States treatment of this issue is more ample than Costa Rican
competition law inasmuch as it is not restricted to price fixing
agreements.66
. a. Exchanges of Information MaterializingAgreements.
In both Eastern States and Cement Manufacturers Protective
Association v. United States, the issue was whether the analyzed
circulation of information was illegal or whether it, in fact, constituted an
agreement not to deal. Although neither case deals with price fixing, the
analyses made could be helpful in determining whether the exchange of
information was material to the illegality.
In Eastern States, by concerted action, the names of wholesalers
who were reported as having made sales to consumers were periodically
reported to the other members of the association." A retailer's decision
not to purchase was not independent; it was the product of an agreement
materialized in the circulated list of offenders." Hence, the list was not
illegal. The agreement not to deal derived from its circulation."0
On the other hand, in Cement Manufacturers, the trade association
members exchanged information on the credit of purchasers and on
specific job contracts.7 The information simply indicated whose accounts
were overdue.', Here, the information circulated was not illegal; neither
was the refusal of the association members to deal with delinquent
purchasers." In short, the exchange of information did not create an
74
illegal agreement.

65. P.C.D.E.C. art. 11 (Costa Rica); Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1890).
66. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1890).
67. Eastern States Retail Lumber Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600, 601 (1914).
Cement Mfrs. Protective Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 588 (1925).
68. Eastern States, 234 U.S. at 608.
69. Id. at 609.
70. Id.
71. Cement Mfrs., 268 U.S. at 591.
72. Id. at 599.
73. Id. at 604.
74. Id.
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b. Exchanges of Information FacilitatingAgreements
Exchanging of information in itself is not illegal.75 In Maple
Flooring Manufactures Association v. United States, the Supreme Court
examined the gathering, computation, and distribution among the members
of the association of the average cost to association members of all
dimensions and grades of flooring, freight rates for flooring, as well as
quantities and quality of flooring sold and prices received.'
The Court held that the evidence did not establish price uniformity
across the industry or that substantial uniformity had resulted from the
activities of the association." Furthermore, the Court held that, "[n]or was
there any direct proof that the activities of the Association had affected
prices adversely to consumers . .

.,,"

In order for an exchange of information to be illegal, that is, to
facilitate an agreement, an effect on output and prices is required.'

9

In

American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, the Court analyzed
petitioners' entering upon an "Open Competition Plan. "1 The plan
allowed, "extensive interchange of reports, supplemented as it was by
monthly meetings at which an opportunity was afforded for discussion "of
all subjects of interest to the members ....
The Court found that the members of the Plan began actively to
cooperate, . through meetings, to suppress competition by restricting
production. Read. The minutes of a meeting held by the Plan's members.
"If there is no increase in production, particularly in oak, there is going to
0981

be good business .

. .

. No man is safe in increasing his production. If he

does, he will be in bad shape, as demand won't come." 2 Thus, the Plan
did affect output and prices.
In United States v. Container Corp. of America, there was not
much controversy among the Justices regarding the interpretation of
applicable law to the facts, the burden of proof rested with the plaintiffs.
7'- P.C.D.E.C. art. 11 (Costa Rica).
76. Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563 (1925).

Id. at 567.
Id. at 567.
79. American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377 (1921) (Holmes,
Brandeis, and Mckenna, JU., dissenting).
'o. Id. at 393. The plan stated: "Knowledge regarding prices actually made is all that is
"

7.

necessary to keep prices at reasonably stable and normal levels .

. .

. There is no agreement to

follow the practice of others, although members do naturally follow their most intelligent
competitors, if they know what these competitors have been actually doing .... " Id.
81. Id.

82.

id. at 402.

134

ILSA Journalof Int'l & ComparativeLaw

[Vol. 3:119

Therefore, two conclusions may now be reached:' under both United
States and Costa Rican law, exchanges of information, are not illegal."
Plaintiffs must provide evidence to establish that the actual exchange of
information materialized, facilitated, or was intended to materialize or to
facilitate an agreement, thereby having an effect on production and prices.
Under Costa Rican law, however, as established under part "b" above, the
materialized agreement being a tacit one, the antitrust enforcement
authorities would additionally: a) require proof as to its actual existence
(minutes of meetings, telephone conversations, exchange of documents to
the effect, etc.); and b) need to establish that economic conditions
favorable for the existence of such an agreement existed (because in their
absence, the existence of an agreement to collude is very unlikely)."
Under Costa Rican competition law article 11, only exchanges of
information materializing or facilitating (or intending to do so) price fixing
agreements are illegal. Exchanges of information directed to any other
type of agreement among competitors are excluded .16
III. ARTICLE TEN: HORIZONTAL RESTRAINTS ARE ALWAYS SUBJECT
TO THE RULE OF REASON DOCTRINE

Article ten general prohibitions: public, private monopolies and
monopolistic practices that hinder or limit competition or the access of
competitors to the market or that exclude competitors from the market are
prohibited and must be sanctioned according to articles twenty-four,
twenty-five and twenty-six of this law, with the exceptions set forth under
article nine of this law" (emphasis added).
The discussion of which restrictive business practices should be
analyzed under the so-called rule of reason or, on the contrary, which
practices are a per se violation of the antitrust laws, have filled up a

83. United States v. Container Corp. of Am., 393 U.S. 333 (1969).
84. P.C.D.E.C. art. 11 (Costa Rica); Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1890).
85. POSNER, supra note 24, at 140, considers that in American Column & Lumber Co. v.
United States, 257 U.S. 377 (1921), from an economic standpoint, there was no evidence of a
price fixing agreement because there were no economic conditions favorable for the existence of
such agreement. In fact he considers that the circumstances - a very low level of concentration in
the industry -were extraordinarily unpropitious for collusion and that it was very unlikely that
the hardware manufacturers could collude effectively without explicit price fixing. Possible
explanations for the exchange of information were provided by Justice Brandeis in his dissenting
opinion. Posner finds those explanations convincing. The dissenters in this decision dominated
the Maple Flooringdicta four years later.
86. P.C.D.E.C. art. 11 (Costa Rica).
87. P.C.D.E.C. art. 10 (Costa Rica).

1996]

Mufioz

substantial amount of pages of the more than one hundred year old case
law history in the United States.
In general, in order for conduct to be illegal it has to be
unauthorized or against the law.88 Specifically, per se violations of the
antitrust law are considered inherently anti-competitive and injurious to the
public without any need to determine if it actually injured market
competition. 9 In accordance with the per se doctrine, courts need not
inquire into the reasonablenessof a conduct before determining that it is a
violation of the antitrust laws.90 Thus, for instance, in United States v.
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. ," regarding per se price fixing the Supreme Court
stated:
The reasonableness of prices has no constancy due to the
dynamic quality of the business facts underlying price
structures. Those who fixed reasonable prices today
would perpetuate unreasonable prices tomorrow, since
those price would not be subject to continuous
administrative supervision and readjustment in light of
changed conditions. .

.

. Congress has not left us the

determination of whether or not particular price-fixing
schemes are wise or unwise, healthy or destructive ...
[P]rice-fixing combinations which lack Congressional
sanction are illegal per se; they are evaluated in terms of
their purpose, aim or effect in the elimination of so-called
competitive evils.9
Therefore, if a conduct is per se illegal, no analysis should be required as
to whether it is reasonable, justified, or injurious. Contrario sensu, a
conduct is not per se illegal and subject to the rule of reason, if an analysis
is indeed required.
Nevertheless, from the actual analyses made by the Supreme Court
during the 1970s and 1980s, one draws the conclusion that a rule of reason
analysis is always required. Courts actually analyze whether justifications
exist an agreement among competitors who fix prices; they determine
whether price fixing agreements are reasonable or ancillary; and they
examine whether competition is enhanced rather than restricted.93 This
88. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 747 (6th ed. 1990) (defining the word illegal).
89. Id. at 1142.
90. Id.
91. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
92. Id. at 218, 221, 228.

93. Broadcast Music v. Columbia Broadcast Sys., 441 U.S. 1, 23, 24 (1979).
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conclusion is expressly confirmed by the landmark Broadcast Music case.9 '
In the specific case of Costa Rican competition law, article 10, General
Prohibitions, provides the general threshold requirement.
Article 10
directs a rule of reasoned analysis in all cases reviewed under Costa Rican
competition law, whether a complaint is filed by a private party or is
brought ex officio; whether it is an absolute monopolistic practice
(horizontal restraints of trade) under article 11 or a relative monopolistic
practice (vertical restraints of trade) under article 12; or whether it is a
merger or acquisition under article 16.91
9
In National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States 6
the Court reviewed and summarized the rule of reason doctrine.' The
Court analyzed the facts in light of the doctrine and concluded that the
doctrine did not apply to the facts." Thus, the Court did not decide that
the conduct was illegal until it had analyzed the doctrine alad the facts.
Furthermore, in both Broadcast Music and NCAA, the Court found
price fixing to exist, yet exempted it from antitrust per se liability." If
price fixing, the most condemned horizontal restraint of trade could be
reasonably justified, then the inevitable conclusion is that horizontal
restraints are no longer per se illegal.
In Broadcast Music, the Court expressly stated:
"Not all
arrangements among actual or potential competitors that have an impact on
price are per se violations of the Sherman Act or even unreasonable
restraints."'10 Additionally, Judge Bork in Rothery Storage & Van Co. v.
Atlas Van Lines, established that, "[i]n [Broadcast Music], [NCAA], and
Pacific Stationary, the Supreme Court returned to the law to the
formulation of [Addyston Pipe & Steel] and thus effectively overruled
[Topco] and [Sealy] as to the per se illegality of all horizontal restraints."
(emphasis added). 0'
94. Id.

P.C.D.E.C. arts. 11, 12, 16 (Costa Rica).
9"
National Soc'y of Prof'l Engr's v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
' The Court traces the following path: Mitchel v. Reynolds 1 P. Wins 181, 24 Eng. Rep.
347 (1711); Joint Traffic Assn. (direct/indirect test), 171 U.S; then Circuit Judge William H.
Taft's United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. (ancillary test), 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898),
affirmed, 175 U.S. 211 (1899); Standard Oil (naming the doctrine), 221 U.S. 1, 60, 64-65, 68
(1911); Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, (pro-competitive effects test).
9 . National Soc'y of Prof'l Engr's, 435 U.S at 696.
"9 Broadcast Music v. Columbia Broadcast Sys., 441 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1979); National
Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Oklahoma, 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
'0". Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 23.

'o

1986).

Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, 792 F.2d 210, 277, 229 (D.C. Cir.
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Hence, not all horizontal restraints are per se illegal.
The
syllogism is very straight forward: under the per se doctrine, no analysis
is required as to the reasonableness or justifiability of the conduct in order
to determine its illegality; and under a rule of reason, such analysis is
indeed required.
Courts need to determine (and actually do) the
[un]reasonableness of a horizontal restraint before establishing its legality
or illegality. Then, horizontal restraints are not per se illegal and, hence,
are subject to the rule of reason doctrine.
Furthermore, in the case of the Costa Rican law, every restraint of
trade examined under the competition statute has to comply with the above
quoted general threshold of article 10 and is subject to a rule of reason
analysis.'°2
When examining the factual circumstances, article 10 requires the
determination that certain results exist: hindering or limiting competition;
the access of competitors to the market; or excluding competitors from the
market.' 3 This requirement amounts to a test of reasonableness which is
more strict than the one required in the United States, and, hence, to a full
rule of reason.
IV. ARTICLE SIXTEEN: MERGERS
Article 16: Concentration is understood as the merger, acquisition
of control, or any other action in virtue of which corporations, stock,
trusts, or assets in general are concentrated, as long as it occurs among
competitors, suppliers, clients, or other economic agents with the purpose
or consequence of diminishing, damaging, or hindering competition or the
free availability of similar goods and services or others substantially
related.
In the investigation of concentrations, the criteria for measuring
the substantial power over a relevant market shall be taken into account, as
determined by this law. Article 16 of the Costa Rican law, the letter and
application of section 7 of the Clayton Act of 1914 (as reformed in 1950
and in 1980) and the 1992 Department of Justice and Federal Trade
Commission Horizontal Merger Guidelines (the Guidelines) will be the
legal provisions reviewed under this section.
Although in many respects in the United States the treatment of
mergers has differed from the 1960s to the 1990s, the issues involved in
such treatment have not: definition of relevant market, definition and the

102. P.C.D.E.C. art. 10 (Costa Rica).
103. P.C.D.E.C. art. 10 (Costa Rica).
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verification of market power, ease of entry to a market, and interpretation
of the effects clause.
The Warren Court defined the rules in Brown Shoe Co. v. United
States (Brown Shoe),1 4 in United States v. Philadelphia National Bank
(Philadelphia Bank),"'5 and in United States v. Von's Grocery Company
(Von's).' °0 In all three cases, the Court ruled for the plaintiffs. However,
in 1974 the approach radically changed with United States v. General
Dynamics Corporation (GeneralDynamics).'Article 16, which must be read in conjunction with articles 14
(relevant market) and 15 (market power), though lacking the most
fortunate Spanish syntactic, takes a very adequate approach. A substantial
market power is required.'10 For the determination of market and market
power, all criteria deemed conducive to such determination is allowed.
Substantial market is not sufficient for an article 16 illegality; intent to
monopolize is also required. No presumption of intent or of "likeliness to
substantially lessen competition" may be drawn from sole market power.',
Article 16 applies only to competitors acting among themselves. Only
corporations are covered by the statute. That is, physical persons are
excluded from its scope"0° and joint ventures are excluded from its scope."'
The following is a summary of the most important issues regarding
the examination of mergers under United States and Costa Rican
competition law. In general, Costa Rican law is consistent with the more
lenient trend that the United States has more recently experienced.
A. The Definition of Market
The narrower the market is defined, the stronger the market power
any single company has in the market. Plaintiffs want to define market
narrowly, while defendants want to define market broadly. To measure a
market, two elements need be taken into account: the product market and
the geographic market.

104. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).

105. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
106. United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966) (Stewart, J. strongly
dissented).
107. United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974). The opinion was
written by Justice Stewart, the strong dissenter in Von's Grocery Co.
108. P.C.D.E.C. art. 15 (Costa Rica).
109. P.C.D.E.C. art. 16 (Costa Rica).

110. P.C.D.E.C. art. 16 (Costa Rica).
111. P.C.D.E.C. art. 16 (Costa Rica).
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In Brown Shoe the two above mentioned elements were
examined." 2 Product market was defined as men's, women's, and
children's shoes." 3 Geographic markets were delineated as "cities with a
population exceeding 10,000 and the environs in which [the merging
parties] retailed shoes through their own outlets.""' The Guidelines refer
to both elements. Although neither article 16 nor 14 expressly draw this
distinction between product and geographic markets, the distinction may
prove useful and available.
Regarding the product market, product substitution is an essential
concept. In United States v. E.L du Pont De Nemours & Co.,," the Court
specifically addressed the issue.
The Court found that a "very
considerable degree of functional interchangebility" existed between
cellophane and other products."' It took into consideration the "crosselasticity of demand."", Thus, it defined the product market as the
"flexible packaging material market," rather than limiting it to the
cellophane market, strictu sensu, as the government had advanced." 8
Article 14 includes the element of product substitution."19
In addition, probable supply responses should be considered in
defining the product market. Firms not currently producing or selling the
relevant product that are likely to respond and enter the relevant market
"within one year and without the expenditure of significant sunk costs of
entry and exit in response to a small but significant and nontransitory price
increase"'20 should be included when calculating product substitution.
Article 14 allows the reading of probable supply responses into the
determination of the relevant market. 2'
Regarding the geographic market, supply from imports is crucial.
In United States v. Aluminium Co. of America (Alcoa), the outcome of the
case shifted because of imports (production abroad) being included in the
relevant geographic market definition.12 The Court stated: "The case at
bar is however different, because, for ought that appears there may well
112. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 324 (1962).
113. Id. at 327.
114. Id. at 339.
115. United States v. E.l. du Pont De Nemours, 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
116. Id. at 399.
117. Id. at 400.
118. Id. at 400.
119. P.C.D.E.C. art. 14 (Costa Rica).
120. P.C.D.E.C. art. 14 (Costa Rica).
121. P.C.D.E.C. art. 14 (Costa Rica).
122. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
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have been a practically unlimited supply of imports as the price of ingot
rose. . . . [H]ad [Alcoa] . . .raised its prices, more ingot would have
been imported.",23 The possibility of including supply from imports may

be validly read into article 14 of the Costa Rican competition law.
In general, all elements included in United States statutory and
case law for the determination of the relevant market may be found in
Costa Rican competition law.
B. The Existence of Market Power
Merger cases ask whether combining two firms will create new
market power. "But one must remember that market power does not itself
create liability; it is, at most, a threshold requirement that must be satisfied
before liability can be imposed."' 2 In General Dynamics,in the Supreme
Court reached back to Brown Shoe't for the proposition that while marketshare percentages are "the primary indexes of market power - its structure,
setting for
history and probable future - can provide the appropriate
27
judging the probable anticompetitive effect of the merger."'
Power to control prices or to exclude competition is the sort of
market power that Courts are after. The following factors should be
considered in determining whether two merging firms will acquire market
power as to control prices or to exclude competition:
a. Market share: It is only one basis for inferring market power.
Market share is a proportion: the denominator is the market which is
determined as stated previously and expressed in dollars of sales; the
numerator is the sales volume in that market. However, the ability to
charge more than the competitive price still has to be determined. In
b. Direct measurement: If costs plus profits equal price, then profits
equal price minus costs. By determining profits it may be determined
whether they exceed the normal competitive equilibrium industry

123. Id.
124. AREEDA & KAPLOW, supra note 1, at 582.
125. See United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, (1974).

126. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
127. Id. at 322 n.38.
128. POSNER, supra note 24, at 112, considers that "[t]he revisions in our thinking about
mergers calls for conservative rules of liability." He further contends that "[tihere is little basis
in current thinking for automatic intervention in markets in which the four largest firms have a
combined market share less than 60 percent." Id.
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return.' 9 Nevertheless, the calculation of costs is often a very difficult
one.
c. Conduct of the merging parties: For example, sustained below-cost
pricing that cannot be otherwise explained.'"
d. Elasticity of demand: The responsiveness of consumers to changes in a
product's price. If it is inelastic, it is likely that there is market
power. "'
e. Supply substitution and entry: This element is complementary to the
concept of elasticity of demand. It is not sufficient to know whether
consumers will respond to changes in price, it is also necessary to
know whether competitors (currently producing the item or who may
shortly enter the market) can respond to changes in price, that is,
whether they are able to expand their output in response to a price
2
increase by a competitor with a high market share.
Article 15 of the Costa Rican competition law allows the use of all
of the above mentioned elements.
C. The Effects Clause
Plain raw market power to unduly restrain competition is not
illegal under United States or Costa Rican competition law. Section 7 of
the Clayton Act forbids only those mergers that may substantially lessen
competition or tend to create a monopoly.'" Article 16 prohibits mergers
and acquisitions which have "the purpose or consequence of diminishing,
damaging or hindering competition or the free availability of similar goods
and services or others substantially related. "'uWhile United States law requires a substantial possibility that the
merger restricts competition, Costa Rican law's threshold is whether the
merger actually restricts competition or has the intention to do so. The
Warren Court cases cited above were rather severe in favor of plaintiffs
and against mergers, thereby admitting assumptions on the existence of
undue restraints to competition. In PhiladelphiaBank, for instance, the
Court found that:

129.
analysis is
130.
131.

United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, (2d Cir. 1945). A profit
used there.
Id.
Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc., 457 U.S. 332 (1982).
132. United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 494-96 (1974).
133. Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 7 (1914), as amended Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. §
13 (1936).
134. P.C.D.E.C. art. 16 (Costa Rica).
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a merger which produces a firm controlling an undue
percentage share of the relevant market, and results in a
significant increase in the concentration of firms in that
market, is so inherently likely to lessen competition
substantially that it must be enjoined in the absence of
evidence clearly showing that the merger is not likely to
have such anticompetitive effect .... "I
No assumptions can be read into Costa Rican law for two reasons.
Firstly, the language of article 16, as opposed to section 7 of the Clayton
Act, requires a specific result or intent, which has to be proven
accordingly. No possibilities of undue restraints, as opposed to section 7
meet the threshold. 3" Second, the trends shown in the cases examined by
the Court in the 1970s and in the Guidelines and in its application by the
Federal Trade Commission'" indicates that the operation of such
assumptions was not positive.'
Moreover, New York University's Professor of Law, Eleanor
Fox, applied the guidelines, as promulgated in 1982, before the 1984 and
1992 amendments made them even more hospitable to mergers. She
reached the conclusion that the government probably would not have sued
in Brown Shoe, Alcoa, Von's, and General Dynamics.'39 Furthermore, in
general, the mergers challenged by the government between 1963 and
1978 were not anti-competitive. 0 Finally, after the 1992 Guidelines,
merger values in 1994 and in 1995 were record highs, with $ 347.1 billion
and $ 363.00 billion, respectively."'
In sum, article 16 requires that an undue restraint of competition
be caused or intended. Recent application of the Guidelines may provide
clarity in the interpretation of article 16.12 In addition, the application of
United States competition law in the 1960s, a practice of being too strict

135. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 363 (1963).
136. P.C.D.E.C. art. 16 (Costa Rica).
137. The Federal Trade Commission enforces the antitrust laws.
138. United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974).
139. Eleanor Fox, The New Merger Guidelines: A Blue Print for Microeconomic Analysis,
27 ANTITRUST 519, 590-91 (1982). See also AREEDA & KAPLOW, supra note 1, at 877.

140. Espen B. Ekbo & Peggy Wier, Antimerger Policy under the Hart-Scott-RodinoAct: A
Reexamination of the Market-Power Hypothesis, in THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF
ANTITRUST: THE PUBLIC CHOICE PERSPECTIVE 147 ( Fred McChesney et al.).
141.
142.
mergers.

N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 1995, at DI.
The Guidelines were promulgated by the Justice Department and used in analyzing
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on mergers and too lenient on plaintiffs, should not be used as guiding
principles.
D. Mergers and Acquisitions Covered Under Article 16
Section 7, Clayton Act provides:
No person engaged in commerce or in any activity
affecting commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly,
the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital
and no person subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal
Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or any part of
the assets of another person engaged also in commerce or
in any activity affecting commerce, where in any line of
commerce or in any activity affecting commerce in any
section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may
be substantially to lessen competition or to tend to create a
monopoly.... ,43

After comparing the texts of section 7 and article 16, the following
conclusions may be reached regarding the types of mergers and
acquisitions included in article 16:
a. Article 16 includes acquisitions by physical persons. Before the 1950
amendment, section 7 referred only to corporations.
b. Article 16 includes the acquisition of assets. Before the 1950
amendment, section 7 referred only to stock.
c. Article 16 excludes the acquisition of assets by an economic agent from
a non-economic agent. For instance, the owner of a mine may legally
purchase a cattle ranch which is rich in minerals.
d. Article 16 does not provide for a pre-merger notification and approval
procedure similar to one required by the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act of
1976. Such a procedure would be very convenient and advisable.
e. The wording of article 16 does not include the idea that eliminating a
potential competitor may be a basis of antitrust violation. The
potential-competition doctrine was applied by the Supreme Court in
Federal Trade Commission v. Procter & Gamble Co. (Clorox).'"
Richard Posner is correct in considering that, in any case, the Court
has not applied the concept of potential competition very well and that
the essential problem is the impossibility of developing workable rules
of illegality in this area:
143. Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 7 (1914), as amended Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. §
13 (1936).
144. Federal Trade Comm'n v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967).
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There is no practical method of ranking even crudely, the
potential competitors in a market for the purpose of
identifying a set of most likely or most feared entrants.
And even if one could identify such a set through the
methods of litigation, one would not know how to evaluate
the elimination of one of its members . .

.

. The doctrine

of potential competition was introduced into antitrust law
by the Supreme Court, and the Court can abandon it - and
should do so . . .. [Tihe elimination of an individual

potential competitor can be expected to have no
competitive significance at all, since there are presumably
a number of equally potential competitors - firms that
could enter the market at a cost no higher than that of the
eliminated firm and would do so if the market price were
appreciably higher than the competitive level. There may
be cases in which this presumption could be rebutted if
only we knew how to measure the entry costs of different
firms or to determine reliably the perceptions of the firms
in the market. We can do neither of this things, so that if
the government were required to prove as a matter of fact
that the elimination of a given competitor altered the
structure of competition, it would always fail."5
V. MONOPOLY AND MONOPOLIZATION

Under both United States and Costa Rican competition law, not
every oligopoly and by extension, not every monopoly is illegal. Not
every oligopoly monopoly unduly restricts competition. Neither law
sanctions oligopolies monopolies solely for the reason that they are
oligopolies monopolies.
While section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act provides that
"[elvery person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or
combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any
part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony .

. .

."16

Costa Rican

competition law does not even have a similar provision forbidding
monopolization or the attempt to monopolize.

145. POSNER, supra note 24, at 122.
146. Sherman Antitrust Act. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1890).
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Costa Rican competition law, however, does have the general
threshold requirement of article 10."7 In accordance with that provision,
only oligopolies that hinder or limit competition, that hinder or limit the
entry of competitors, or that force the exit of competitors from the market
8
are to be sanctioned.1
In virtue of the lack of a similar provision to section 2, Costa
Rican law does not forbid monopolies or monopolization. Nevertheless,
even if Costa Rican competition law provided a regulation such as section
2 of the Sherman Act, due to the sine qua non requirements of article 10,
it would not sanction monopolies that do not unduly restrict competition.
That is, it would not sanction oligopolies and monopolies solely for the
reason that they are oligopolies (monopolies).
The following is a brief analysis of the interpretation and
application of Section 2 of the Sherman Act. Its purpose is to establish
that in general antitrust theory monopolies that do not unduly restrain
competition are not illegal.
Standard Oil Co. v. United States,' United States v. American
Tobacco Co.'"' and United States v. American Can Co.-ss represent the
early landmark cases in monopolization. In each of these cases the Court
found that, in addition to market power, reprehensible conduct in attaining
or keeping such power was also required." 2
In Standard Oil, the Court! ruled that the defendant's many
acquisitions and mergers gave rise
in the absence of countervailing circumstances .

to the

prima facie presumption of intent and purpose to maintain
the dominance over the oil industry, not as a result of
normal methods of industrial development, but by new
means of combination

. . .

with the purpose of excluding

others from the trade and thus centralizing in the
combination a perpetual control of the movements of

147. P.C.D.E.C. art. 10 (Costa Rica).
148. Id.
149. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 55, 61-62, 75 (1911).

150. American Tobacco Co: v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946).
151. United States v. American Can Co., 230 F. 859, 901-902 (D. Md. 1916), appeal
dismissed, 256 U.S. 706 (1921).
152.

Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 55, 61-62, 75; American Tobacco, 328 U.S. at 781;

American Can, 230 F. at 901-902.
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petroleum and its products in the channels of interstate
commerce .... 53

In American Tobacco, the Court found that
the acts ensued justify the inference that the intention
existed to use the power of the combination as a vantage
ground to further monopolize the trade in tobacco by
means of trade conflicts designed to injure others, either
by driving competition out of the business or compelling
them to become parties to a combination. . . . 1
In American Can, the Court specifically addressed the issue of size
vis a vis illegality:
[Congress] has not accepted the suggestion of some
influential men that the control of a certain percentage of
industry should be penalized. It has not yet been willing to
go far in the way of regulating and controlling
corporations merely because they are large and powerful,
perhaps because many people have always felt that
government control is in itself an evil, and to be avoided
whenever it is not absolutely required for the prevention of
a greater wrong."'
However, the 1945 Alcoa decisionl-* unnecessarily created
confusion by enlarging the scope of "exclusionary acts."' The decision
suggests, using the words of District Court Judge Wyzanski in United
States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.,"' "that one who has acquired an
overwhelming share of the market monopolizes whenever he does
business, apparently even if there is no showing that his business involves
153. Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 75.
154. American Tobacco, 328 U.S. at 781.
155. American Can, 230 F. at 902.
156. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, (2d Cir. 1945).
157. The confusion was unnecessary because, first, the Court verified that
size does not determine guilt; that there must be some 'exclusion' of competitors; that
the growth must be something else than "natural" or 'normal', that there must be a
"wrongful intent", or some other specific intent; or that some 'unduly' coercive means
must be used", and, second, because the Court found that Alcoa's "size not only
offered it an 'opportunity for abuse', but it utilized its size for abuse.
Id.
158. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), aff'd
per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
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any exclusionary practice."1s9 The Alcoa Court ruled that there "is no
more effective exclusion than progressively to embrace each new
opportunity as it opened, and to face every newcomer with new capacity
advantage of
already geared into a great organization, having the
'
experience, trade connections and the elite of personnel." 60
District Court Judge Wyzanski in United Shoe who clarified
Justice Hand's dicta in Alcoa by reiterating that, in accordance with Justice
Hand himself, there is antitrust liability if the monopoly is not owed to
superior skill, superior products, natural advantages (including
accessibility to raw materials or markets), economic or technological
efficiency (including scientific research), low margins of profit maintained
permanently and without discrimination, or licenses conferred by, and
used within, the limits of law (including patents on one's own inventions,
or franchises granted directly to the enterprise by a public authority).",
Thus, a line should be drawn between business acts which are
exclusionary and business acts which are just aggressive business acts.
Good competition does not mean soft competition. Good competition
entails aggressive acts which are not exclusionary, which, for instance, do
not meet the criteria of article 10 of the Costa Rican competition law'62 or
are not of the nature of the acts included under section 1 of the Sherman
Act.
Hence, section 2 of the Sherman Act requires the presence of
monopoly in the form of market power and the exercise of such market
power with the purpose of attaining or maintaining monopoly. Costa
Rican competition law does not forbid the existence of monopoly even if
coupled with exclusionary acts. If it did, the generally required threshold
of article 10 would have to be met. That is, exclusionary acts would have
to be present.

159. Id. at 295.
160. Aluminum Co., 148 F.2d at 416.
161. Id. at 416.
162. Article 10 sanctions acts which hinder or limit competition, those which hinder or
limit the entry of competitors, or those that force their exit from the market.

